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I. ON THINKING ABOUT DISCLOSURE
When I mentioned my participation in this symposium, a visiting German
law student asked what my topic was. "Disclosure," I replied, "under the
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. An earlier
version of this paper was presented at the conference In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One
Year in the Life of Sarbanes-Oxley - A Critical Review at Michigan State University College
of Law, September 19, 2003.
I thank the Michigan State Law Review and the Michigan State University College
of Law for organizing the conference, and for publishing this symposium issue of the Law
Review. My thanks are also due to Bobby Ahdieh, Oline Brandes, Brandon Becker, Bill
Carney, Jesse Fried, Joseph Franco, John Kenneth Galbraith, Jean-Marc Gollier, Mae
Kuykendall, Frank Partnoy, Pierre Schlag, Jack Schlegel, an unknown reader at the Australian
Stock Exchange, and the Finance Transactions Colloquium at UB for, as the case may be their
mere interest in, indulgence for, or comments on various aspects of this argument. In
converting this talk into a somewhat more substantial paper, I have made a few revisions and
additions in order to flesh out the argument, and I have added slight bibliography, but I have
retained much of the insouciant tone. The research assistance of Lisa Danish is gratefully
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act,1 which is the law that Congress passed in response to
Enron and similar scandals." I thought to myself, a bit smugly perhaps, that
my answer was a model of professorial clarity, and I was well on my way to
giving an elegant talk. My bubble soon popped.
"Disclosure?" she asked, "I don't know that word. What is it in
German?"
I speak German pretty well, or used to, but I couldn't think of the word,
and found myself explaining rather than translating. I reasoned to myself that
certainly the Germans have publicly traded securities, and so disclosure, and
so, no doubt, a word .... Recourse to a pocket translator illustrated the
difficulty. Bekannt machen, to make known, was too general and casual.
Enth dlung was worse, with the associations of personal intimacy that
"confide" has in old novels. After playing with synonyms of synonyms, we
settled on offenlegen, literally to lay open, and so to make public.
"So," my student friend offered helpfully and with the civil lawyer's faith
in clear language, "the law must start by defining what must be made public."
"Indeed," I replied. "As we've been trying to do since the 1930s, but it
is very complicated. Entire legal practices are built up around this question of
what must be disclosed. We have repeatedly discovered that the existing
understandings were not quite adequate, and so we have written more laws,
because, after all, there is nothing like more law for clarifying things. So the
question is whether this time, with Sarbanes-Oxley, we've gotten it right."
To be slightly less flippant: it is a little difficult to imagine that somehow,
after almost seventy years of trying to mandate appropriate levels of
disclosure, a hastily drafted statute will cause the security markets to be
properly informed. Later in this paper, I want to spend some time thinking
about what it means even to talk about getting disclosure right. How would
we even know if our rules for disclosure were correct? Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart said of pornography that he knew it when he saw it,2 but good
disclosure seems to be the opposite: after an Enron, or a Worldcom, we
conclude that disclosure was inadequate (or else prices would not have been
bid up so high, and there would not have been a crash). We thus know what
disclosure is when we don't see it. More generally, we find it easier to
recognize what we broadly call securities fraud, at least after the fact, than to
define disclosure ex ante. While I am all for learning from mistakes, and I
myself have offered an analysis of Enron,3 there is a certain intellectual
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified at
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
2. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. See David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a
Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61 (2003).
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modesty, not to say impoverishment, to approaching law in terms of its
failures. Perhaps we should devote less effort to post-mortems, and instead try
to think harder about what we are trying to achieve with our capital markets.
It must be admitted that after Enron and other spectacular accounting
scandals, it is a little difficult not to think about failure. Expressions of anxiety
about the success of our corporation and security law are ubiquitous. This very
symposium entitles itself: In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One Year in the
Life of Sarbanes-Oxley - A Critical Review. Other conferences and symposia,
no doubt less interesting than ours, are similarly concerned about the state of
corporation law. For example, at the upcoming meeting of the American
Association of Law Schools, the section on business associations will hold a
session entitled Is It Broken and Can We Fix It? Corporate Governance After
Enron. What is flatteringly referred to as "the literature"-most urging some
set of reforms, with the usual counterpoint of scholars criticising any reform
undertaken by any government, or at least counselling caution, all so
lawyerly-is growing by leaps and bounds. At least judging by the
prominence in law reviews, corporation law is more interesting than it has
been in many years, perhaps ever.
All of this attention, which I personally appreciate, might cause a cynic
to question how genuine the concerns of the corporation law professoriate are.
After all, it is hard to imagine attending, much less publishing, a conference
entitled Corporate Governance: A Celebration of Perfection, or a symposium
called A Year of Business under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: An Appreciation of
a Masterpiece of Legislative Drafting. It is almost inconceivable that law
professors would announce that corporate governance, or any other area of the
law, was solved, free of difficulty, perfected. The modem American law
professor defines herself in terms of a critique of the status quo, combined with
a proposal for reform. When could corporation law professors say that
corporate governance is flawless? To look across the aisles at other sub-
disciplines, when could constitutional law professors say that democracy has
been achieved, or evidence professors that trials produce truth? If the problem
is solved, then the research is, or ought to be, finished. To use the economic
jargon, professors are incentivized to perpetuate, rather than solve or ignore,
the problems that define their sub-disciplines. From this perspective, it is
unsurprising that we have not really defined disclosure, that we speak of it
mostly in the negative, and that we have very little idea (beyond the
tautological) of what things must be made public. We mumble for good
reason, and if I were consistent, I would stop at this juncture.
Nonetheless, I am going to try and make three rather substantive points
about disclosure. First, we could try to understand disclosure in a more
affirmative, and more principled, fashion than we now do, which amounts to
concluding, after a crash, that disclosure was inadequate, i.e., that certain
Summer]
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things an investor would have reasonably wanted to know were not revealed.
Therefore, I will try to define disclosure in terms of ideas basic to modem
finance. With such an understanding, in theory, we should be able to
recognize whether a new law, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, actually
improved disclosure.
My second and most important point is that the understanding of
disclosure in terms of theoretical finance offered here is pretty much a failure.
While fun and maybe even correct as a matter of finance theory (what that says
about our theory I leave to the reader's mercy), the finance understanding will
not answer the perennial question of whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or any
other law mandating the provision of information to the financial markets is
worth the cost and bother. Some of the failures of the financial theory of
disclosure offered here are practical, the familiar sorts of problems that arise
when one attempts to see one's models in the world. More fundamentally,
defining disclosure in terms of finance requires a close correlation between
disclosure and efficiency, and it appears unlikely that such a correlation could
be established. More deeply still, the understanding of disclosure suggested
here-and deployed in most finance theory-is fatally dependent on
oversimplification of how communication works.4 Nonetheless, those who
believe the teachings of finance may be convinced, and the ideas are great fun.
The "utility" of the thought experiment set forth here is essentially
philosophical; it helps make our legal commitments explicit.
Third, for those who, like myself, are skeptical that prices can ever be
made very true, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may, in spite of everything, be on the
right track.
II. DEFINING DISCLOSURE IN TERMS OF FINANCE
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's Reliance on Disclosure for Corporate
Governance
As corporation and securities law has done since the Thirties, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes both internal and external institutional
mechanisms in order to protect investors. Within the firm, the directors
monitor, on behalf of shareholders, the activities of managers. The Act
therefore devotes considerable attention to the qualities of directors and to
their relationship to the publicly listed firm. In general, the Act requires more
independence on the part of directors than state corporate law had previously
4. See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM
IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT (2003); see also Westbrook, supra note 3.
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required. Thus, in the longstanding debate over whether directors should be
disinterested or knowledgeable, the Act opts for disinterested.
The congressional preference for independent directors is by no means
obviously prudent. The problem is that directors require two virtues that tend
to be reciprocals of one another, namely a critical objectivity (lack of interest)
and particular knowledge of a firm. The ideal director may thus be situated
somewhere along a continuum, defined at one end by the truly independent
director, who is likely to know less about the firm and be relatively unbiased,
and on the other end by the director with an employment, shareholder, or other
substantial direct interest in the firm, who is likely to have incentive and
opportunity to know a lot about the firm, but who by the same token is more
likely to have his judgment skewed by his very interest. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act clearly opts for independence, and thereby takes the risk of minimizing
knowledge. Indeed, Enron itself appears to have had relatively little conflict
of interest on its board of directors, and so it was by no means obvious that the
way to prevent future cases like Enron was to require more director
independence; Congress might have tried harder to require director
knowledge.6
As Jeffrey Gordon has pointed out, the Act's preference for relatively
independent, and inevitably, relatively ignorant directors is likely to make an
informed equity market that much more important to corporate governance.7
Independent directors, like investors, will have to base their decisions largely
on what management tells them and will have little other basis on which to
base their judgments. The Act thus makes the central internal institutional
mechanism for shareholder protection, the board of directors, more dependent
on the intentional disclosure by management, just like the primary external
mechanism, a well informed stock market.
In practice, of course, this distinction between internal and external
mechanisms of shareholder protection is a bit artificial. The "external"
mechanism of the stock market-and the associated market for corporate
control-has been internalized through so-called performance based
compensation schemes. To be explicit about a mechanism no doubt familiar
to most of this audience: the equity market disciplines managers by affecting
stock prices; good management, which, by definition, means managers who
do well for the company and its shareholders, is rewarded when the price of
5. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301-305 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1,
78u(d)(5), 7241-7243).
6. Despite the heated language of the Senate Report. See S. REP. No. 107-70, at 24
(2002).
7. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CoNN. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2003).
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the company's stock rises. Such managers keep their jobs, perhaps earn larger
bonuses, and their own equity-based compensation is more valuable.
Conversely, managers who do a bad job for their company are punished. As
Enron so clearly demonstrated, however, in order for the stock market to
assess the fortunes of the company, and hence the quality of management, the
market must have true information about the progress, or decline, of the
company. Market discipline of corporate governance-which is also the
mechanism that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act implicitly uses to compensate for its
reliance on disinterested, but less informed, directors-thus depends on
transparent accounting. Consequently, the Act attempts to improve the quality
of information available to the market in a number of specific ways, for
example, by imposing new regulations on accounting firms,' by requiring that
managers certify their financials,9 by requiring that companies adopt corporate
codes and register them, by being more prompt in reporting their contractual
obligations,'0 and by being far quicker in reporting changes in their business
prospects. " More broadly, the Act responds to the essentially microeconomic
(if unfortunately widespread) concern for corporate malfeasance by using what
this paper argues is an essentially macroeconomic tool, the regulation of
disclosure requirements, and hence the securities markets writ large.
B. Discrete Silences Over Disclosure
To considerable extent, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a direct response to
Enron. 2  Many of its provisions, including those listed above, were
implemented in order to make illegal the particular forms of chicanery that
Enron employed. In so doing, however, the Act inevitably raises the question
with which this paper began and with which we have been wrestling since the
8. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 104, 106, 108, 201-209 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77s, 78j-l(f) to (1), 7731-7734).
9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(m)). This is
hardly new. See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor
Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 ViLL. L. REV. 1139, 1156-57
(2003).
10. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350).
11. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 409 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(1)). The
deterrence/ enforcement mechanisms may be understood as sticks; the point is not to punish
people, but to encourage them to fulfill the affirmative obligations imposed on them elsewhere
in the securities law and regulation.
12. See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Enron 's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on
the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 671, 73
(2002) ("Act simply follows headlines from Enron and other corporate scandals").
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'33 Act:' 3 what information must be disclosed by a company that wishes to
offer its securities to the public? At this level, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act thus
promises a substantive refinement of the old idea that financial markets work
better with a certain amount of mandatory public disclosure. Those at all
familiar with securities law discourse will be unsurprised to find that, at least
by its terms, the Act provides no such refinement. As my opening vignette
implied, bureaucratic evasion is at work in the familiar language we use to
discuss disclosure. What does it mean to say-in the context of a policy
debate-that information "must be disclosed"? Of course information must
be disclosed if the law requires it, but the question is what should the law
require. That our securities markets require "some degree of mandatory
disclosure" is hardly news, but the question inescapably addressed by the Act
and its implementing regulations is "what degree" of disclosure is to be
required.
The politically obvious answer is that the new law mandates the
provision of information at least to the degree necessary to prevent the
market's correction, whether that be the Crash of '29 or Enron, neither of
which were prevented by existing law. Crisis thus reveals the inadequacy of
existing law, and partially justifies the passage of new law. By the time the
new law is passed, however, the crisis which justified its passage may well be
over, or largely over. The law thus addresses a situation that no longer exists.
Moreover and more importantly, we must live under the new law. Thus an ex
post facto justification for a regulatory regime, under which we expect to do
business in the future, is at best very partial, and intellectually rather
embarrassing.
Such regulatory regimes may, however, be perfectly workable.
Regulators often have a pragmatic sense of what degree of disclosure they
should be trying to or can achieve, and that sense may well stand in for a more
principled, even articulable, position on what degree of disclosure is
warranted, and what the benefits of such a degree of disclosure would be.
Regardless of whether or not regulators have a position on the matter which,
for political reasons, they keep to themselves, 4 as an intellectual (or
democratic) matter we do not have a public discussion of the degree of
disclosure we are trying to achieve, and why this set of regulations-as
opposed to some other set-is likely to achieve that goal. What would it mean
to define disclosure ex ante, in the abstract?
13. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (2000)).
14. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 7.
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C. A Finance Understanding of Disclosure
Despite the after-the-fact and evasive character of securities policy
discourse, some things can be said about its meanings. Securities law arises
in response to crises "-manias, panics, and crashes," to use Kindleberger's
elegant title. 5 As already suggested, because securities laws are efforts to
prevent future crises, we may understand the affirmative meaning of such laws
in terms of the structure of crises. To be very basic, a financial crisis involves
the bidding up of an asset, and the precipitous repricing of that asset. The
bidding up of an asset generally involves a great number of trades; financial
bubbles are characterized by high trading volume. Second, by definition, the
creation of a bubble and the bursting of the bubble are radical changes in price,
that is, financial crises may be understood as examples of extreme volatility.
Third, because the same asset was priced at wildly different levels within a
relatively short time span, the price of the security cannot be said to reflect the
security's intrinsic worth. Thus, because securities laws are passed in order to
prevent financial crises, we may say that securities laws are designed to foster
markets that are the opposite of bubble markets. Specifically, insofar as a
securities law achieves its intentions, we might expect the better-regulated
market to exhibit neither the feverish trading ("mania"), nor the volatililty
associated with financial bubbles. We might even suspect that the law brought
price and value into closer conjunction with one another ("improved price
discovery").
How does securities law attempt these difficult tasks? Since the '33 Act,
the federal government has required companies whose securities are publicly
held to disclose information about themselves to the public. In response to
many financial crises since the Thirties, the federal government has demanded
still more information and demanded that companies grow still more
transparent. But what does this mean? How transparent is transparent
enough? Do the benefits from increased disclosure, or, more precisely, from
compliance with a new set of regulations, outweigh the undoubted costs?
Suppose, for the moment, the possibility that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or
some other proposed regulation succeeded in realizing its ideals, that the
market for a company's equity became, at last, "transparent." What would that
mean? By definition, in a perfectly transparent market, investors would have
all the information in the possession of the company that the investors needed
15. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES (4th ed. 2000).
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to price a security accurately. 6 As price discovery improves, prices would
better express intrinsic value. As markets become more transparent, they
become more efficient. Mandatory disclosure, the microeconomic regulation
of individual actors, thus entails and helps realize a macroeconomic ideal,
efficiency writ large. This is, of course, an ideal, but the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and all other laws entail ideals; norms. To put the same point in different
terms, we do not pass laws without hoping for a benefit (nor is cost-benefit
analysis possible without a benefit), and the benefit entailed in disclosure
regimes is better markets.
In order to avoid confusion, let me return, for a moment, to the idea that
securities law discourse is rarely very forthright. Mandatory disclosure is
generally justified as an effort to prevent fraud, and in the aggregate, to protect
investors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act states that it is "[t]o protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant
to the securities laws," and then, somewhat mysteriously, "and for other
purposes."' 7 Why not take the Act at its word, and understand it simply as a
congressional effort to protect investors?
While the protection of investors is a laudable intention (at least within
some bound entailed in our understanding of the assumption of risk rewarded
by capitalism), justifying securities law purely on that basis is somewhat
disingenuous. First, capitalism assumes the existence of risks. People lose
money in markets. This does not mean that participants in a given market are
not to be protected from behavior that is outside the rules of that market. In
the context of the securities market, participants expect to be protected from
"fraud" very broadly understood. But while traditional, it is a little misleading
to read "the protection of investors" to mean "the protection of investors from
fraud." Most forms of fraud are addressed by expost regimes such as tort or
criminal law, but all publicly traded companies have mandatory disclosure
obligations. Unlike fraud, failure to meet one's reporting violations is illegal
regardless of whether any investor was actually misled or even injured.
More importantly, the class of potential investors is in some respects the
financial markets itself, and in our society, financial markets are pivotal
governance mechanisms. The securities laws that inform the financial markets
therefore have a public significance quite apart from whatever impact they
may have on individual investors who are being protected. A simile may be
helpful: understanding securities regulation in terms of the relatively private,
and relatively comfortable, terms of investor protection is like understanding
16. Yet one can imagine a market that is very "transparent," i.e., nothing is really
hidden, and yet hard to value precisely. That, at any rate, has been my own experience in the
real estate market.
17. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. 745, 745.
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campaign finance reform as an effort to provide a fair chance to political
candidates-true, but not the most important truth. Americans seem to have
difficulty acknowledging that finanicial markets, with all their inequalities, are
a form of government. Securities policy discourse, at any rate, is strikingly
denuded of explicitly political language. But the existence of a polite silence
does not mean that the unmentioned is unimportant.
How do we know whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or any disclosure
regime, is realizing its political ideal, and making markets more transparent in
fact, and hence more efficient? To put the problem slightly differently, many
have pointed out that Sarbanes-Oxley imposes costs. But what about the
benefits? All disclosure regimes impose costs on companies, but I think few
businesses would want to return to the financial environment of the 1920s.
Repeal of Glass-Steagal"8 was one thing, but repeal of the '33 Act would be
quite another. I am aware of no politically serious proposals to abandon
federally mandated disclosure. But within that context, how do we know
whether or not a given regulation is sensible-that is, beneficial enough? To
put the problem a third way, in terms familiar to academic finance, can we
expect to see an improvement over Fisher Black's famous characterization of
securities markets, i.e., that the value of a security was usually more than half
of its price, and usually less than twice its price, i.e., that the market was very
imprecise about what a security was worth? 9
It is very difficult to determine when price and value are in close
conjunction, and when they are not. As Black made so clear, value never
announces itself-it is not clear how we could ever declare a market truly
efficient. If we cannot know how efficient a market is, it would be surprising
if we could know how transparent a market really is. Although we can
measure how much companies are reporting, as Enron so convincingly
demonstrated, reporting is not the same thing as informing. How can we
measure the extent to which, if at all, reporting makes companies transparent,
so they can be priced correctly, i.e., so that price converges on value and
efficiency is achieved?
To confront this difficulty, I'd like to propose a thought experiment.
Even if we cannot know, in any final sense, how transparent a given market
really is, thinking done under the rubric of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis (ECMIH) may teach us a few important lessons about how to think
about improved transparency, and as a result, how to evaluate a securities
regulation. Recall the famous argument that a financial market cannot
maintain a perfectly efficient equilibrium, because in a market they believe to
18. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162.
19. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
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be efficient, marketplace actors do not have the incentives to acquire and
process the information on which efficiency itself depends.20 That is, as the
informational efficiency of the market improves, the competitive benefits of
research decline. As a corollary, as the efficiency of a market increases, one
would expect to see the number of trades (specifically, those trades made in
belief of an informational advantage) to decrease. By extension and all else
being equal, the fully transparent (more efficient) market should have less
trading than the partially transparent (less efficient) market.2 In a fully
transparent market, investors would have relatively little hope that a stock was
undervalued, and so would appreciate at an extraordinary rate, and would
therefore have less incentive to trade, in a word, to speculate. In the face of
very good public knowledge, there is little room for speculation. As a
security's price is believed to approach its true value, there is little reason to
pay anything more, or less, than the asking price.
In such circumstances, the price of a security should converge on that
predicted by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)-diversified investors
should be compensated at the market rate, plus a premium for their ability to
tolerate the risk (beta) associated with particular stocks. Even in such a
market, there would still be some trading, as the circumstances of enterprises
and individual investor appetite for risk changed. But news (the preoccupation
of ECMH), the volatility of particular enterprises (the preoccupation of
CAPM), and the risk preferences of particular investors exist in a market
regardless of how transparent the market in question is. Such factors,
therefore, affect price independently of company disclosure. In less
transparent markets, however, such as that for Enron stock, trades are not only
driven by the factors just mentioned, but also by shifting opinions (or hopes
or fears) about the security's fundamentals, matters which are subject to
company disclosure. Because opinions may change very quickly, less
transparent markets may provide incentives to trade that cannot-by
definition-be present in transparent markets, where knowledge of an
enterprise's fundamentals should go some distance toward grounding opinions,
keeping hopes in check, and allaying fears.
Volatility, like volume, should be reduced by an increase in transparency,
and for basically the same reasons. Presumably, if investors had known how
exposed Enron was, and how little money it was actually making, they would
not have bid up the price of Enron stock so high. If it had never achieved
much altitude, the price of Enron stock could not have fallen very far. In
short, consistently accurate pricing precludes the mania and correction that
20. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 393 (1980).
21. But see infra note 23.
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constitute financial crises. More generally, if the price reflects the intrinsic
value of an asset, there is little reason to pay much more, or much less, for the
asset, than its asking price." As a result, increases in transparency should
cause us to observe increased price stability, and conversely, a lack of
volatility.
23
22. The effect of an increase in transparency on price levels is not obvious. As
suggested above, in the fully transparent market, one might expect a security's price to converge
on that predicted by CAPM or one of its descendents. But even perfect transparency is unlikely
to realize the theories of finance. The application of price theory depends on the determination
of variables outside the scope of disclosure. Perfect transparency would not mean that investors
knew anything more about new technologies, interest rates, systemic risk, and the like. To
make matters worse, it seems quite possible that empirical measures of historical volatility
(beta) have been influenced by a historical lack of transparency.
Approaching the question of price as a matter of compensation for investor's risk presents
other difficulties. On the one hand, due to the reduction in uncertainty about the value of a
security-which imposes anxiety and so cost upon investors-one might expect a security's
price to go up as transparency increases. On the other hand, the price of many securities in
contemporary markets may be systemically inflated by misreporting ("earnings management"
and worse) which tends to make the company look better than it is. While hardly efficient, such
misreporting seems to have caused excessive valuations of the stock of Enron, Worldcom, any
number of internet companies, and so forth. More transparent markets, and hence the reduction
of such misreporting, therefore may result in a reevaluation of many securities, and ultimately,
lower share prices.
A behavioral approach raises similarly open-ended questions. In contemporary markets,
the existence of uncertainty provides an opportunity to take advantage of the hope and
ignorance of others ("a sucker is born every minute"), and that must be worth something.
Moreover, investors may systematically overestimate their own acumen, that is, may value the
chance to take advantage of someone more highly than the chance that they will be gulled. So
perhaps moving to more transparent markets would depress the price of many securities. And
so forth.
23. The text makes a few assumptions which are relatively modest in light of
contemporary markets, but which should be made explicit. First, this thought experiment
presumes that the status quo ante is not opaque, and that investors are in the market. Markets
may be so opaque-even corrupt-that potential investors do not enter the market. The SEC
traditionally, and often persuasively, has maintained that its regulation has increased the
willingness to invest, and indeed, the U.S. equity markets are very broad. Thus one can imagine
a regulation that increases transparency and so improves pricing, while at the same time
boosting confidence in the market, causing new entry, and thereby boosting volume. Therefore,
in understanding transparency and volume in inverse terms, one must correct for changes in the
size of the investment pool. For example, one might look at trading activity on a per capita
basis. Moreover, at least in the United States, where so many individuals are invested in the
equity markets, it is difficult to imagine that there are many people with the wherewithal and
appetite for risk required for investment in the equity markets, but who are deterred by a lack
of transparency.
Second, a disclosure regime may make new information available to the market, thereby
opening up new trading strategies and opportunities, and perhaps fostering increased volatility
and volume, and hence deteriorating quality of price. Such circumstances ought, however, to
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To generalize: we should understand mandatory disclosure regimes as the
regulatory effort to increase transparency and thereby increase informational
efficiency of markets. As the transparency of a market increases, and all else
being equal, we should see a decrease in trading volume and in volatility. The
financial understanding of disclosure offered here is congruent with the
regulatory intention of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other securities laws:
requiring the appropriate level of disclosure is thought to prevent mad buying
(manias), i.e., excessive volume, the resulting bidding up of prices, and
crashes, i.e., excessive volatility.24 Conversely, it should be possible to
measure the success of such a disclosure regime by noting the changes in the
character of trading. If a change to a regulatory regime increases transparency,
we should observe a lower volume of trades at steadier prices. Finance thus
gives us a standard-at least in theory-with which to evaluate the success of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other reforms of our corporate disclosure regime:
did they cause a steadying of trade in the affected securities?
III. SOME LIMITATIONS OF UNDERSTANDING DISCLOSURE
IN FINANCIAL TERMS
A. Thinking and Seeing
Thought experiments are strange things. Famously, as we approach the
speed of light, and assuming that the speed of light is observed to be constant
regardless of the frame of reference, what would we observe? The focus on
something which cannot be experienced, travel at the speed of light, allows us
to think about what cannot be directly observed, but which might nonetheless
affect observable phenomena. So while we have yet to travel anywhere near
the speed of light, we have empirical confirmations of Einstein's special theory
be self correcting, as the market learns the truth about the company, and price and value
converge.
Third, it is important to remember that this thought experiment defines disclosure in terms
of its purpose, achieving transparency, which in turn is understood to be in terms of efficiency,
i.e., the information in the possession of a company's management that would contribute to
accurate pricing of the company's equity. Therefore simply making information available to
the public is not, in and of itself, disclosure. Even true information can be presented in ways
that are not transparent. Such information does not contribute to better pricing, and therefore
are not here deemed disclosure.
24. The idea of a market approaching perfection offered here is also congruent with
another more famous speculation, that of John Maynard Keynes on interest rates. See infra note
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of relativity.25 With regard to the present problem-how should we think
about disclosure-I was hoping that by thinking about the effects of something
which evidently cannot be known directly-the accuracy of pricing (the
relationship of price to value)-we might discover something which could be
observed, and which would indicate increases or decreases in the accuracy of
pricing, namely trading behavior. As I hope to have demonstrated, as a matter
of the logic of financial theory, a real improvement in transparency should
result in a more efficient market for securities. Such a market should be
recognized to be more efficient, and therefore we should observe changes in
trading behavior. Conversely, we should be able to look for changes in trading
behavior to indicate whether a given regulatory change is contributing to
transparency and hence efficiency.
But if we actually were to look for empirical confirmation, that is, if we
were to attempt to apply the understanding of disclosure set forth here (an
endeavor beyond the scope of this paper, as they say), to test the effectiveness
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we would immediately run into substantial
practical difficulties. As already suggested, trading activity may reflect many
variables other than information in the possession of the disclosing company.
Suppose that a regulation is introduced, and suppose that shortly thereafter we
observe the hoped-for reduction in volume of trades and volatility with regard
to a given security. It would be very difficult to know whether and to what
extent that change in trading behavior was caused by a rising belief that the
truth about the company was known, and the extent to which that consensus
could be credited to the regulation in question. Any number of factors may
have affected trading behavior. The world is just too noisy to figure out
whether an additional regulation-there are already so many-made a
difference in the efficiency of a market.
Moreover, as behavioral economists are increasingly successful at
suggesting, investors might not be very rational in the first place, that is, the
entire idea of the efficient market may be overdone, which of course has
ramifications for securities regulation.26 If investors are not very rational, then
even as the quality of information about a company improved, investors might
(rationally) continue to speculate, not only on the uncertainty remaining about
25. I took the occasion to (re?)learn from my old physics text. The special theory of
relativity is empirically supported by phenomena including the time dilation in the decay of
muons (fast moving subatomic particles), the relativistic shifts in the momentum of small
particles as they are accellerated, and most dramatically, in the relation of energy to mass and
velocity realized in fissile nuclear reactions. See RAYMOND SERWAY, PHYSICS FOR SCIENTISTS
AND ENGINEERS WITH MODERN PHYSICS 897-919 (2d ed. 1986).
26. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135 (2002).
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the company, but on the trading patterns of other investors. Consequently, a
market may never reach a level of transparency or efficiency sufficient to
dampen trading volume or volatility. This possibility seems to comport with
recent experience in equity markets, which have seen huge volume and
substantial volatility in spite of the widespread availability of vast amounts of
information. Perhaps markets may be very transparent, i.e., companies
truthfully disclose all they know, and nonetheless remain so inefficient that
speculative trading continues unabated.
Nor is the inefficiency of transparent markets a matter of accident. As
well as the familiar difficulties posed by empirically evaluating models, or by
the compromises that behavioral economics has forced upon claims to
efficiency, the financial understanding of disclosure offered here suffers from
its stunningly simple understanding of communication. Let me suggest some
ways in which communication is complicated, and so provide some sense of
why the ideal of transparency is, finally, as unobtainable as other aspirations
which animate our laws, such as democracy and justice. (We will always be
able to hold conferences.)
B. The Partiality of Disclosure
Disclosure, like accounting more generally, is a reductive process. Vast
enterprises are reduced to a few numbers, coupled with several pages of text.
Annual reports or 1O-Q filings, although impressively detailed documents, are
radical simplifications of the business organizations that they describe. Thus,
in deciding "what must be made public," a company necessarily decides on
ways that it can simplify and communicate its business. One must assume that
companies will speak well of themselves, i.e., that disclosures will be
systematically biased.27 This bias need not be mendacious. It is unreasonable
to expect the participants in an enterprise to be completely objective about the
enterprise to which they have devoted themselves. (Objectivity, critical
distance, is an intellectual virtue, which means that it is unevenly distributed
and cannot be assumed.) Even if disclosures are made entirely in good faith,
a summary or redaction of a firm's business is intensely subjective. The
company frames its picture of itself, and photography is an art.
Does the fact that disclosures are necessarily partial and therefore more
or less biased mean that a company's disclosures are not true? No, disclosures
may indeed provide a true view of the company, just like photographs may
indeed provide a true snapshot of an event, but such a view is inherently
limited by its perspective; all communications are partial. A complete
27. See generally Westbrook, supra note 3.
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communication would simply replicate the reality that it sought to transmit,
disclosure 6 la the Borges story of the aleph, in which the world was
observable from every angle at the same time.28 It is literally impossible to tell
all.
If investors understand that communications are necessarily partial, it is
difficult to imagine that they could think that any disclosure, however detailed
and well-intentioned, had so successfully transmitted the truth about a
company that the market for the security in question was approaching
efficiency, and that therefore the security's price expressed its intrinsic value,
and that therefore speculative trading was pointless. Rephrased, once the
partiality of disclosure is acknowledged, it is difficult to imagine an
information regime that was so convincing as to depress speculation. But a
decline in speculation was the source of the reductions in volume and volatility
that, as I suggested above, could be taken to indicate an increase in efficiency,
and so the effectiveness of regulations requiring transparency.
As I have suggested already, the SEC is unlikely to be forthright about
the ideal embodied in its disclosure regulations. (Perhaps the closest the SEC
has come is in its argument for a pure "fraud on the market" theory of insider
trading.) Nor, for that matter, is the Agency often likely to admit that current
regulations, whatever they might be, do not already require that all be told. It
is the Agency's critics, and more generally, critics of our capitalism, who are
most forthright about the ideal of transparency, and who perhaps unwittingly
make its dreamlike status is most obvious.2 9 So, long before Enron, critics on
the left argued that corporations did not disclose the cost of their operations on
society and the environment, and that therefore the financial markets were ill-
informed, and made socially suboptimal choices. After Enron, this proposition
has seemed fairly strong, and so with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act we see
disclosure requirements rise accordingly. But the argument is open ended:
what could be sufficient information about society and the environment (about
the development of history?) in order to evaluate whether a given
corporation's disclosure of the impact of its operations was complete?
Nor is the dream of transparency as perfect information an ideal held
only by regulators and by those who believe that current regulation does not
go far enough-by what we might loosely call the left. Those who have faith
in the efficiency of markets, and especially the use of new financial
instruments to price-that is, to use the collective power of the market's
28. See JORGE Luis BORGES, THE ALEPH AND OTHER STORIES 1933-1969 (Norman
Thomas di Giovanni trans., 1970).
29. See Kim & Michael Fortun, Due Diligence and the Pursuit of Transparency: The
Securities and Exchange Commission, 1996, in PARANOIA WITHIN REASON: A CASEBOOK ON
CONSPIRACY AS EXPLANATION 157, 187-89 (George Marcus ed., 1999).
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capacity to gather and assess information-any eventuality, any risk, employ
strong versions of transparency. Just like mandatory disclosure requirements,
ECMH entails an ideal of communication. Indeed both ECMH and mandatory
disclosure regimes base their claims to good governance on the management
of information. The dream of perfect information expressed by ECMH has
also been expressed legally, for example by lowering capital requirements or
removing legal barriers to the consolidation of financial markets, and most
famously and explicitly, by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.30 At
root in ECMH and most other expressions of faith in financial markets is an
ideal of communication "eventually incorporating everything within the
transparent domain of information."'', Based on (ever closer to perfect)
information, the meta-discourse of financial analysis would be true, that is, we
could truthfully discuss prices. Prices themselves would also be true-faithful
representation within faithful representation-because price would represent
value. As a result, microeconomic decisions would distribute resources in
accordance with human values, and in the aggregate, markets would go far
toward producing the good society along the lines prophesied by Adam Smith.
We would have a capitalism that we could affirm.
While dreams may be necessary for political life, and this particular
dream may be required by our politics, we should acknowledge that this is a
dream. Law professors and others "less embroiled in the actual traffic of
information tend to romanticize what information is, how it is produced, and
how it circulates and what it can become: a universal, all-telling language that
can integrate the micro and the macro into one narration."32 Financial policy
discourse, at least in the academy, has rested on a radical idealization of what
it is to communicate information, and so to the reception of information I now
turn.
C. The Mulitiplicity of Readings
Courts have claimed that they understand disclosure in terms of what a
reasonable investor would find relevant to an investment decision. This line
of analysis has helped to sort out insider trading cases, in which insiders traded
on the basis of information that was clearly relevant to an investor (because it
motivated the insider's trades), and was equally clearly not available to the
public. But while the merger at issue in the classic Basic Inc. v. Levinson or
the mining strike in SEC v. Texas GulfSulphur33 are indubitably significant
30. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
31. Id. at 189.
32. Id. at 190.
33. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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facts that should be disclosed truthfully (Basic) and prior to trading by insiders
who wish to trade based on that knowledge (Texas Gulf Sulfur), the existence
of such specific and exciting facts does little to define the duty to disclose in
general, which asks what "ordinary" information is relevant to a good
investment decision. Securities law understandably has erred on the side of
inclusiveness, and the size of disclosures has grown apace. In due course,
regulators have come to focus on making disclosures understandable ("plain
English"), realizing that too much information, or information delivered in
impenetrable terms, is not useful to the investor, and therefore not really
information at all. Disclosure involves striking a balance between saying too
little and saying too much, between reasonable simplifications and
obfuscation.
Securities law thus attempts to bridge a gap: companies are legally
required to disclose, but investors decide. Regulators control what companies
write, but they cannot control what investors read. They can do little more
than hypothesize about the investing public (personified as the "the ordinary
investor," nephew to the "rational man" of classic tort cases, no doubt) served
by their regulation. But on what basis do investors actually decide what a
stock is worth, or more precisely, whether they are willing to buy or sell a
given security? How could such a question be answered? Real-time polls,
perhaps conducted at the time of trading ("and now, a few questions from your
regulator")? Even such a bothersome approach would be unlikely to produce
much insight. Investors often do not know why they have invested as they
have, or do not know in any sense more interesting than the obvious,
tautological, or vague. As the recent dot-com bubble amply demonstrated,
investors can find "reasons" for any price they are willing to pay. Our reasons
for doing almost anything are complicated and hard to articulate, which is why
self-knowledge is a difficult thing.
Different investors neither have the same reasons for assessing a security
in one way or another, nor even understand a given disclosure in the same
way. Indeed, the so-called "turn to interpretation" that has marked any number
of disciplines in the latter part of the twentieth century has caused us to focus
on how meaning is made by the recipient of a communication. Multiple
readers means multiple readings. To put the point in financial terms, Warren
Buffet and I both can read an income statement, but we do not read the same
statement. (I like his reading better.) Indeed, a sophisticated reader is likely
to read a single statement in different ways simultaneously.
The same point can be made by focusing on "the information" conveyed
by a statement. At one level, we may speak of the data in a statement in terms
of what it would take to reproduce the statement. So, for example, a Mozart
sonata can be communicated on a few sheets of lined paper, i.e., is comprised
by very little data. But what information does it contain? That question
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depends on who receives the communication. Mozart means different
things-each of them true in their way-to an ordinary listener, to a
professional musician, to a critic, and to Beethoven. To speak of the
"information" conveyed to the market by Mozart's "disclosure," i.e.,
publication of sheet music, would be ridiculous. Nor does any one meaning
make the others irrelevant. But while the subject may be less sublime, can we
doubt that any description of a company, located within an industry, itself
understood within overlapping social, economic, political, and environmental
contexts, can be understood in many different ways, on many different levels?
Disclosure thus results not in price discovery, but instead in congeries of
opinions. The price of a security is an internally unstable construct. Sustained
or fine-grained equilibria are impossible because the fine-grained agreement
of opinions is unlikely and ephemeral. More simply, markets are slaves to
fashion.34
Securities law has proceeded on the assumption that communication, and
so disclosure, is a form of transport. A set of objects, information, is conveyed
from the company to potential investors. Once we abandon this image of what
it means to communicate, then we cannot assume that provision of the right
information by companies will result in stable consensus on the right price
among readers. The presence of truth is little reason to expect assessments to
converge; fashions change. Because we cannot communicate the truth, and
because we would not agree on it if we read it, the idea that disclosure can
render companies truly transparent-and that equity markets will therefore be
much more if not perfectly efficient-is wrong. Consequently, except perhaps
in the most egregious of circumstances (and maybe Enron was such a case),
we are unlikely to observe the evidence of increases in transparency, viz.,
reductions in volatility and volume, predicted above.
34. A sort of parable for the intellectual effort that I've put forth: Towards the end of
The General Theory, John Maynard Keynes argued that, over time, capital would increase, and
as the supply increased, the price of capital, the market interest rate, would fall. The result of
this historical process would be the end of the capitalist class of which Keynes was an
ornament, an eventuality Keynes called "the euthanasia of the rentier." JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 374-77 (1936). Quite
apart from the fact that many more people live off the interest today than when Keynes wrote,
there are any number of reasons to disagree in principle with Keynes' critical assertion, perhaps
the willful daydream of an old man on the eve of another war, that "the demand for capital is
strictly limited." Id. at 375. See JAMES BucHAN, FROZEN DESIRE: THE MEANING OF MONEY
276-77(1997). While not discussed by Buchan, not least of the reasons the demand for capital
is unlimited is that capital - for our purposes, stock - is a mechanism of control. And while the
demand for material goods may be limited, it is difficult to imagine satisfying the lust for
power.
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IV. CHASTENED EXPECTATIONS FOR DISCLOSURE AND
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
To retrace the steps of the argument thus far: a serious theory of
disclosure would attempt to integrate financial disclosure with understandings
of information, market performance, and most broadly, governance. Bits and
pieces of such a theory are scattered throughout academic literature and indeed
judicial decisions, but I know of no straightforward effort to evaluate
mandatory disclosure in terms of its effect on trading behavior, and hence the
quality of governance achieved by our markets.35 In the second section of the
paper, I undertook to use familiar ideas from financial theory to do just that.
While perhaps intellectually pleasing, this definition seems to be of limited
use, as discussed in the third section of this paper. Unsurprisingly, defining
disclosure in terms of financial theory raises some familiar problems with the
relationship between financial theory and actual markets. More
fundamentally, however, such a definition raises perhaps less familiar
problems internal to financial theory itself, in particular, its radical
simplification of the nature of communication, and consequently inadequate
theory of information. (Perhaps the bureaucrats are right to be evasive about
the markets that mandatory disclosure regulations are designed to achieve, that
is, to be nearly silent about the capitalism that provides their reason for being.)
And so we return home from this little epistemological jaunt, a bit tired but
none the worse for wear.
35. There may be others, but the closest pieces that I can think of are Gordon, supra
note 7, and Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions are Not Enough: The Significance
of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities
Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 223. Gordon understands that the SEC is attempting
to improve price, but worries that in so doing, they will limit the discretion of management to
withhold information that might be valuable, notably in merger talks, and that therefore
managers will be disadvantaged and will not make money for shareholders. Two thoughts: first,
while a disclosure rule may change the terms of the negotiation, and hence the price, it is
difficult to see how this is more than mildly redistributive. Money lost by one side is gained
by the other. Second, and far more importantly, Gordon acknowledges, and then simply
ignores, the public significance of the capital markets. Similarly, based upon a very complete
overview of the debates surrounding mandatory disclosure, Franco argues that a mandatory
disclosure regime addresses the informational asymmetries between issuers and investors, and
thereby enhances the efficiency of the market. But Franco never quite gets to a discussion of
exactly what it would mean to say that informational symetry has been achieved, or how the
efficient market (that his preferred solution is designed to foster) is to come about and operate.
The SEC is quite correct to care about pricing; my only point is that from an intellectual and
democratic (not to say political) point of view, it would be nice if we, and the Commission,
were more forthright about our capitalism.
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Where does this argument leave the question with which we began,
"what must be made public"? Specifically, where does this leave the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? As a number of commentators have pointed out, the Act
is less than it initially appears.36  The Act makes illegal many
things-including much of the behavior at issue in Enron-that were already
illegal.37 The Act specifies and often increases penalties, but this hardly seems
like legislative innovation." The Act also places affirmative duties on
accountants, lawyers, and especially management, in order to ensure that
disclosures are truthful. Under previously existing securities law, however,
such actors were already liable for untruthful disclosures. Due to its redundant
quality, the Act may seem to be mere political posturing, a sop thrown to a
populace rightfully angered at getting ripped off by people who were already
very rich.39
I would like to suggest, however, that the Act is a credible effort to serve
a more principled purpose. The Act does not so much undertake to define
what must be made public, but instead addresses how information is disclosed
to the investing public. As noted above, financial reporting reduces the
complex web of relationships that is a business to very few, ultimately rather
simple, numbers, and relatively few pages of text. While Warren Buffet and
I may not read an income statement in the same way, our readings rely on
conventional understandings, tacit agreements about how things are done
(GAAS) or reported (GAAP). Disclosure thus presumes public understandings
that make communication possible. The Act attempts to encourage various
actors to come up with better conventions for reporting business activities.
Rephrased, the Act attempts to improve financial discourse.
Enron consistently operated outside received understandings of
accounting. To some extent, Enron's unconventionality-and hence the
opacity of its reporting-is due to a lack of agreed upon ways to account for
some of Enron's more sophisticated transactions, a lack that Enron's
management exploited by choosing unduly favorable accounting treatment for
itself. In response, in a number of places, the Act reiterates and reaffirms
36. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
37. See The Fall ofEnron: How Could it Have Happened?: Before the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 58, 103 (2002) (statement of Frank Partnoy); see also
id.
38. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 802, 805, 807, 905, 1104, 1106 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1519, 1520; 28 U.S.C. § 994 note).
39. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).
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existing conventions.4 °  In a few sections, the Act establishes new
conventions.4
Although, in places the Act is concerned with the substance of
accounting, in the main the Act addresses those actors who are responsible for
articulating and agreeing to the explicit and tacit understandings that allow
financial communication to happen. Enron was a dramatic failure of business
culture. Lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, especially the directors
and managers of the firm, and others did not perform their roles properly.
There appear to have been various reasons, including simple greed, conflicts
of interest, and failure to understand. Perhaps most problematically, Enron's
unconventionality was characterized as innovation, and lauded as being in the
interests of shareholders.42 Here again, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's response is
fundamentally conservative: the Act expounds upon the proper roles of
various actors in our version of financial capitalism. While the Act imposes
no one-size-fits-all duty, the Act makes clear that many people active in the
capital markets are responsible to others, and even to the public. Such
responsibilities often include the willingness to report one's activities, and
more broadly, to act in such a way that others in the market can understand the
nature of one's business. The Act is thus a reaffirmation of the standards of
business culture.43 No doubt there is not a lot new here; affirmations of
tradition tend to be short on novelty. But after the long bull market and years
of academic claims that self-interest was always self-correcting, Enron and
other accounting scandals called for a reminder that the culture of American
finance, like any culture, requires adherence to certain ground rules. In
providing that reminder, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be judged a success.
40. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802 (criminal penalties for altering documents); § 903
(criminal penalties for mail and wire fraud); § 904 (criminal penalties for violations of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974); § 1106 (increased civil penalties under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
41. An example is the reporting of credit arrangements and contingent liabilities. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(i) & ()). See also Gordon, supra
note 7. In such isolated places, of course, the Act is in fact providing a substantive answer to
the question with which we began, viz., "what must be made public?"
42. See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 1148-50.
43. A point made even more explicit in SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). See also Richard C. Breeden, Restoring Trust: Report to the Hon. Jed S.
Rakoff, The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Aug. 2003),
available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/Rulingsoflnterest.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
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